Do official forecasts actually provide operational guidance to monetary policy makers? Seriously deficient forecasts could, for example, lead the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to believe wrongly that a recession or a boom is likely; or to do too little or too much; or to act too soon or too late.
T he Common weal tli Government publishes forecasts for the coming financial year in its budget papers. These forecasts underpin its revenue and expenditure estimates and the monetary and fiscal polices announced at budget time. The RBA's forecasts are not published.
In die absence of better published data, for die puiiioses of this note the budget forecasts will be assumed to be not significandy different from those diat drove monetary policy. 11 le budget papers between 1983/84 and 1995/96 have been chosen for study in order to avoid any structural breaks diat might be attributed to changes in government in 1983 and 1996, or to die adoption of an inflation target by die RBA in 1996.
Over the 13 financial years to June 1996, real annual GDP growdi in Australia averaged 3.5 per cent, while the mean of the official forecasts was a litde less at 3.1 per cent (see Table 1 ). The means of the actual and official forecasts of inflation were identical (5.5 per cent).
T he real issue is whedier official forecasts in particular years helped monetary policy-makers determine the right course of action. For example, die narrower range ol forecast real GDP growth (1.5 -4.5 per cent), as compared with die actual range (-0.5 -5.5 for political reasons, to forecast marked recessions and booms. Two of only three real GD P growth forecasts below 2.5 per cent occurred in 1990/91 and 1991/92. By then, a slowing of the economy was undeniable; and both forecasts were, in any case, inaccurate with regard to both the depth of the recession and the strength of the subsequent recovery. Official forecasts of real GDP growth in die early and mid-1980s were varied (see Figure 1 ). Alter underestimating die strengdi of die recovery by almost a half in 1983/84, actual and official forecasts of real GDP growdi in die following diree financial years were close to die outcome. However, die actual increase in real GDP in 1987/88 was almost twice die official forecast.
Official forecasdng of die inflation rate one year ahead during die recovery from die recession of the early 1980s was fairly reliable (see Figure 2) . In 1983/84 and 1985/86, forecast and actual inflation were widiin half a percentage point of one anodier. However, die 1984/85 forecast of a significant drop in inflation to 5.25 per cent was confounded by an actual rate of 6.7 per cent -slighdy below die figure for 1983/84. In 1986/87, die forecast inflation rate of 8 per cent was well below die actual rate of 9.4 per cent Official forecasdng went badly astray at die end of die 1980s. The budget papers for 1989/90 reported that die government considered domesdc demand to be excepdonally strong. However, by 1990/91 die economy dipped sharply into recession with real GD P growdi becoming negative instead of slowing to die forecast 2 per cent By late 1991, Australia's unemployment rate was in double figures for die first time since die 1930s. After die recession of 1991, official forecasters underestimated die strengdi of die recovery in 1991/92, 1992/93 and especially in 1993/94. 1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 Source: derived from Budget Papers, various years.
Official forecasters also underestimated the dampening effect of the monetary contraction on inflation. Inflation for 1990/91 was forecast to moderate to 6.5 per cent, but fell to 5.3 per cent In 1991/92, inflation was forecast to fall another 1.5 percentage points, but instead fell by more than twice that to less than 2 per cent. In 1992/93, the forecast inflation rate was three times the actual rate for that year and twice the actual rate in the following year. In 1994/95, the inflation rate was forecast to rise slightly on the previous 1.8 per cent but nearly doubled.
Analysis of Official Forecasting Errors
A common method of measuring forecasting errors is the calculation of the mean absolute forecasting error (MAE). This statistic takes an average of the absolute differences between the actual and forecast values. Absolute values are used to avoid die loss of information from the summing of positives and negative values.
The MAE for official forecasts of real GDP growth between 1983 and 1996 was 1.05 per cent This is about 30 per cent of the mean growth rate of real GDP for the period under study. The MAE for the inflation rate was 1.2 per cent, which is over a fifth of the mean inflation rate (see Table 1 ).
A common way of assessing the accuracy of forecasts is to calculate a 95 per cent confidence interval using the MAE. The 95 per cent interval covers the area that is two MAEs either side of the mean of the forecasts, amounting to an interval of four MAEs' combined width. The confidence interval indicates that, given the track record of die forecaster concerned, there is a 95 per cent chance that the actual value of die forecast variable will be in this interval. The narrower this 95 per cent confidence interval, die more likely it is diat forecasts are close to actual outcomes on a regular basis. Pin-point accuracy is not expected, but forecasts must get reasonably near to have value. For example, a 95 per cent forecast interval for real GDP growth diat is one percentage point wide could be regarded as sadsfactory. It implies that diere is a 95 per cent chance diat a forecast is widiin 1 percentage point of die actual growth rate of real GDP for a given year. However, a confidence interval that is 5 percentage points wide is of little value because it covers almost every possible contingency. A forecast diat next year there will be a boom or a recession or anything in between is not informative.
The 95 per cent confidence interval for official forecasts of real GD P growth is die interval 1.0-5.2 per cent This confidence interval implies diat official forecasters can say widi only 95 per cent confidence that next year will bring a deep recession, or a strong boom, or somediing in between.
The 95 per cent confidence interval for forecasts of inlladon is 3.2 -7.9 per cent This interval is more than 4.5 percentage points wide, suggesdng that official forecasters have trouble disdnguishing stable prices from rising infladon one year ahead. This suggests that official forecasts between 1983 and 1996 may have provided jxior operational guidance on whedier a monetary contraction, or a monetary expansion, or no change in policy was required.
Some observers might consider that it is more reasonable for official forecasts to operate within a 75 per cent confidence interval. The 75 per cent confidence interval for official forecasts of real GDP growth between 1983 and 1996 was 1.9 -4.3 per cent (see Table 1 ). This interval still includes a recession and a boom; and it covers almost the entire range of official forecasts published between 1983 and 1996. The implications of the 75 per cent confidence intervals for real GDP are similar to those for the 95 per cent interval: official forecasters have trouble distinguishing between strong and poor economic growth one year ahead.
T he 75 per cent confidence interval for inflation is a band 3 percentage points in width (see "fable 1). This is approaching the 2-3 per cent band that is common in inflation targets of central banks. Official forecasters may have been saying something useful about next year's inflation rate.
Other observers might consider it worthwhile to look at a 50 per cent confidence interval for official forecasts. The 50 per cent confidence intervals for real GDP and the inflation rate are both 1.5 percentage points wide. These intervals imply that official forecasters are reasonably accurate about half the time: that is to say, if their forecasts are acted upon, monetary policy changes in the right direction about 50 per cent of the time. Is this sufficient? Friedman (1953) has argued that any alternative to a constant monetary growth rule must succeed more than 50 per cent of the time to warrant serious consideration. This is because, on 50 per cent of occasions, the monetary authority is adjusting monetary conditions in the wrong direction. The variance of a discretionary monetary policy injects additional instability and uncertainty into the m arket However, a constant monetary growth rule, being changeless, would never be an independent source of uncertainty.
The Hawke Government of 1983-91 was aware of the poor value of the official forecasts supplied to it According to John Edwards (1996:394), Paul Keating, the then Treasurer, had ceased to believe the forecasts coming from the bureaucracy by 1989. T he poor official forecasts of that period were, perhaps for this reason, not thereafter a major independent source of instability. However, the unanswered question is what expectations about the course of die economy were guiding monetary and fiscal policy after 1989.
Policy Implications
One purpose of official forecasting is to alert the RBA to the need to revise its monetary policy stance. However, die record of official forecasters from 1983 to 1996 suggests diat diey cannot say, with much better than 50 per cent accuracy, whedier a monetary contraction, or a monetary expansion, or no action is likely to be die correct jiolicy choice.
Given that official forecasts often seem to go astray, it would lie useful to make die forecasting process more transparent One possible reform is die publication of confidence intervals for the forecasts in die budget papers and in the RBA's semi annual statement on monetary policy. These confidence intervals could be based on forecasting errors over the previous five or ten years.
A related transparency option has been developed by the Bank of England. Since February 1996, the Bank of England has published a probability distribution for its forecasts of the inflation rate; and it is considering publishing a similar probability distribution for output (King, 1997:10-12) . A variation on this proposal is the publication of a central forecast and optimistic and pessimistic forecasts based on variations of the key assumptions in the central forecast A further accountability option is to require official forecasters to review their recent forecasts and explain where they went wrong and why, and how they intend to prevent the repeat of such errors.
Despite all their failings, the demand for macroeconomic forecasts seems as strong as ever. It is therefore important that the effectiveness of f orecasts be evaluated from time to time, and that forecasters be as open as possible about how fragile and limited their forecasts are as indicators of the shape of tilings to come. 
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